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Introduction
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and arbitration are forms of out-of­
court dispute resolution mechanisms. Shimglina on the other hand, is a term 
sometimes used as the Amharic equivalent for the term arbitration. In the 
strict sense, however, very little is known about their difference. Even when 
recognized, the difference between ADR and Arbitration is often simplified 
to a matter of degree of some commonly shared element such as the extent of 
intervention.* 1 This article attempts to challenge this view and submits that the 
difference between ADR and Arbitration is indeed significant and relates to a 
difference attributable to their underlying institutional underpinnings. The 
article then contrasts them with Shimglina.
The analysis sets out with a discussion of the main institutions of dispute 
resolution in Section one. Sections 2 and 3 treat the institution of arbitration 
as a variant of the broader institution of adjudication. The sections also ana­
lyze the defining tenets of the institution of arbitration. In Sections 4 and 5 
ADR is addressed in the broader institutional context of contract. Section 6 
will be devoted to the analysis of problems in terminology in the Ethiopian 
context with regard to Shimglina. And finally conclusions have been for­
warded.
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1. Election, Contract and Adjudication: Underlying 
Models of Dispute Resolution Institutions
ADR and Arbitration represent two different institutions. In his groundbreak­
ing theory of adjudication Lon Fuller identified election, contract and adjudi­
cation as the underlying institutions of dispute resolution. 2 While adjudica­
tion is popularly understood as mechanism of dispute resolution, contract is 
taken as a commercial instrument of making deals. Proper understanding of 
the essence of each form (of ADR and arbitration) is imperative for ease of 
understanding the modus operandi and nomenclatures (designations) of the 
various mechanisms of dispute resolution. in other words, understanding the 
essence of each model will help us know, what principles govern its opera­
tion, when is it being properly used, what are its uses, and when it is not be­
ing properly used.
There seems to be a confusion, and even misconception3 in the relation­
ship between arbitration and ADR, and so much of it is attributable to under­
estimating the connection between each form and its underlying institutional 
underpinnings. From the dimension of dispute resolution, what essentially 
makes each of these underlying institutions (i.e. adjudication, contract and 
election) different from one another is the particular way in which the disput­
ing party participates in the process, that is, the particular way that the institu­
tion not only offers but also guarantees the party affected by the outcome of 
the process.4 Thus, the institution of election offers voting as the mode of par­
ticipation to the affected party, contract offers negotiation, and adjudication 
offers presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments.5 While, this constitutes 
the crux of their difference, before an elaborate discussion is offered on their 
differences, let us look at what is common about these three institutions, or at 
least the dispute resolution dimension of each.
At a deeper level, these institutions are subtly interconnected by an indi­
vidualistic ethic. The right to vote (in election), for example, derives from the 
recognition of man as an autonomous, rational being who is responsible for 
his own life, and who should therefore freely choose the people he authorizes 
to represent him, or the course of action he approves of.6 Party participation 
by presentation of proofs and arguments is as much individualistic as partici­
pation through voting. It is premised on the assumption that to get a decision
2 Lon L. Fuller, “Forms and Limits of Ad­
judication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law Re­
view, 363.
3 One view holds the difference between
ADR and Arbitration as a matter of degree
of intrusiveness of the third party between
the parties’ affairs. See Supra n 1, p. 482
4 Supra n 2
5 Ibid
6 http://www.aynrand.org.site/News2? 
page=NewsArticle&id=10385&news-iv- 
c+rl=1021
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in his favor a person has to produce more convincing evidence and arguments 
compared to his adversary. Thus. each party has to do by himself without as­
sistance from the public/state.
According to Owen M. Fiss private law adjudication’s individualistic bias 
is embedded in four notions: (1) It has no place for public interest protection; 
(2) The pursuit of private ends; (3) The assumption that without adjudication 
there will not be harmony between individuals and the purpose of adjudica­
tion is to guarantee that harmony; and (4) Finally. the assumption that the 
adjudicator (judge) is separate (isolated) from the disputants.7 Other scholars 
have also contended that private law adjudication precedes the emergence of 
the state. and can to some extent. be privatized even in the modern world.8
coming to the institution of contract. negotiation is even more individual­
istic in this respect. Backed by the ideal of freedom of contract and the sub­
jectivity of values it underscores the basic tenets of individual choice re­
flected in the promises for exchange of values.
The above being said about the interconnection among the three dispute 
resolution institutions. an elaboration of their difference is now in order. To 
do that. we should first identify two aspects of the models of institutions. 
These are the essential elements and the optimal requirements. The essential 
elements are those defining features of the institution without which the insti­
tution will lose its immanent (internal) order and identity.9 The optimal re­
quirements are. on the contrary. those conditions that raise the institution to 
an ideal (perfect) level of realization.10
From the above analysis. the essential conditions of election that define its 
nature are that the electorate be given the opportunity to vote. “that the votes 
be honestly counted. that the ballot box be not ‘stuffed’. that certain types of 
intimidation be absent. etc”.11 On the other hand. the optimum conditions 
which will raise the participation by voting to its perfect level of realization 
include: an “intelligent and fully informed electorate. an active interest by the 
electorate in the issues. candor in discussing those issues by those participat­
ing in the public debate - conditions it is needless to say. that are scarcely 
ever realized in practice.” 12
The truth is of course; in most elections most voters exercise their voting 
rights even without the necessary information. let alone with rational analysis
7 Owen M. Fiss. “The Social and Political 
Foundations of Adjudication.” (1982) 6 
Law and Human Behavior. 123-125
8 See William M. Landes and Richard
A.Posner. Adjudication as a Private
Good. NBER Working Paper Series
9
10
11
12
No.263. University of Chicago Law 
School. p.18 
Supra n 2. P. 363 
Ibid
Supra n 2. P. 364 
Ibid
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or scrupulous calculation of ends. In other words, the institution of election 
doesn’t necessarily require the participant to be rational. Indeed, most voting 
choices are backed by irrational considerations such as racial. religious. or 
linguistic affiliations than rational analysis. It is not that these are unimpor­
tant in election. Indeed. if every voter in an election could make a rational 
analysis. election could have attained perfection and most disputes on the af­
termath of elections could have been avoided.
The institution of contract likewise has its own optimum and essential 
conditions. The whole idea of contract rests on the idea of consensual ex­
change of values between two or more persons. Negotiation is the process 
through which this act of reciprocity (give and take) takes place. The essence 
of this process of negotiation is the freedom of choice underlying the ex­
change. This in other words. is what we call freedom of contract. Here. 
“underpinning the whole idea of contract is that the parties must act voluntar­
ily. It is axiomatic that contractual liability stems from the parties’ voli­
tion”.13 This. in most legal systems. is translated into expression of consent 
free from defects. So as far as a person expresses consent free from such de­
fects as coercion. deceit. mistake. unconscionability. etc. he will be taken to 
have freely made his choice.
The optimum conditions in a contract may include such matters as fairness 
(equality) of the exchanged values. rationality of choices made by parties etc. 
Such are. however. not essential for the institution of contract to stand on its 
own feet. Since what essentially characterizes a contract is the exchange as­
pect. it suffices if the parties “freely” bargain and conclude their deals.
When we come to adjudication. like the other institutions it also has its 
essential as well as optimum conditions. It has already been set out that the 
distinguishing characteristics of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on 
the disputing party a peculiar form of participation in the process; that of pre­
senting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.14 Thus. the 
essential conditions for an unimpaired or meaningful realization of this proc­
ess mainly are that: the conferring of the opportunity to present one’s evi­
dence and arguments; attention to such proof and arguments from the bench 
or person to whom these presentations are made; and responsiveness of the 
decision (to the proof and arguments presented).
To put it differently. the pillar norms of participation of the affected party 
by presentation of proof and arguments mean that “(1) the adjudicator should 
attend to what the parties have to say; (2) the adjudicator should explain his
13 Ibid sponsiveness. and the Consultative Proc-
14 Melvin A. Eisenbeg. Participation. Re- ess. (1992) 92Harvard Law Review. 411
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decision in a manner that provides a substantive reply to what the parties 
have to say; and (3) The decision should be strongly responsive to the par­
ties’ “proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed from and be 
congruent with those proofs and arguments.”15 The optimal conditions that 
will boost the institution of adjudication to its highest level of realization are 
such factors as the equality in all respects of the parties. such as the fact that 
both parties have representation by intelligent counsel. well - crafted and vig­
orous advocacy is made on both sides. etc.
it is now fairly clear that each of these three dispute resolution institutions 
(i.e., contract. election and adjudication) have differing integral demands that 
make them function in an orderly manner. The other (external) characteristics 
of the institutions emanate from each of these integral demands.
2. Arbitration as a variant of Adjudication
What really distinguishes the non judicial features of arbitration from adjudi­
cation is the fact that arbitrators are private appointees. and judges are state 
officials. Other aspects that are often employed to explain the difference such 
as the assumption that arbitration is a more flexible process. that it is less 
costly. that it is more prompt. that there is more party autonomy16 in it. etc. 
are not essential to the distinction between Arbitration and adjudication. 
These assumptions are of course. either unchallenged ritualized thoughts or 
result from the mere private nature of the arbitrator’s office. In this section. 
we shall examine arbitration against those distinguishing characteristics of 
adjudication namely. the test of attention. the test of explanation (rationality) 
and the test of responsiveness indicated above. We shall also analyze some 
practices in arbitration which i shall call diversions or abuses of the adjudica­
tive model.
2.1. Arbitration and the requirement of attention
Arbitration as a variant of adjudication represents a form of dispute resolu­
tion that guarantees to the disputants the right to present proof and argu­
ments. The test of attention which requires the adjudicator to be attentive to 
the presentations of the parties is one essential ingredient of the adjudicative 
process without which the mode of party participation by presenting proofs 
and arguments will be of no use.17 In other words. the test of attention repre-
15 Id p. 412
16 The importance of party autonomy in
making arbitration more attractive than 
state courts cannot however. be under­
mined. But. the concept is vague and
relative. Thus even when there is little or 
no party autonomy a process may still 
carry the name of “arbitration.”
17 Supra n 14. P. 412
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sents the due process requirement of hearing. The right guaranteed by the due 
process doctrine is qualified as fair hearing. It incorporates such rights as the 
right to present one’s own version of the case, the right to produce evidence, 
to challenge opposing evidence and argument. etc. Fair hearing also demands 
that the opportunities given by the bench to each party be equal.
All the above and other due process requirements are implicitly assumed 
in an adjudicative process. And the requirement of attention is here con­
cerned with the arbitrator’s degree of focus to party presentations. Indeed. if 
the arbitrator doesn’t pay attention to what the parties have been arguing, re­
futing, and criticizing in their presentations what is the use of the presenta­
tions?
In contrast. contract doesn’t guarantee any right to presentation of proof 
and arguments. Even if. one makes such presentations. there is again no as­
surance that the other party will listen to his arguments and proof.18 Negotia­
tion of course involves presentations. but these presentations seldom consti­
tute evidence and/or arguments. These are more of communications often 
intended to discovering the real needs and interests of each other for the pur­
pose of exchanging the right values. Sometimes therefore. a party to a con­
tractual bargain may make a “take it or leave it” offer without engaging in 
any form of explanation. and still the process will not lose its essence. But. 
any position asserted in an adjudicative proceeding has to be supported by 
arguments and proofs; a party cannot get away with a “take it or leave it” ap­
proach in an adjudicative proceeding.
2.2 Arbitration and the test of explanation
Arbitration -as adjudication- is always subject to the test of rationality. This 
means that the arbitrator should render a reasoned award. This strict demand 
for rationality emanates from the nature the mode of participation of the dis­
puting parties takes. The idea is that “if. the only mode of participation con­
sists in the opportunity to present proof and arguments. the purpose of this 
participation is frustrated. and the whole proceeding becomes a farce. should 
the decision that emerges make no pretense whatever to rationality.”19
As a matter of fact. rationality in adjudication presupposes an established 
principle on which the outcome will have to be based. Explanation 
(rationality) is that bond which connects the outcome with this principle. 
Presentations of proof and arguments are competing claims as to which of the 
established principles should underlie the outcome. Although rationality is 
not peculiar to adjudication. it is not a necessary requisite (intrinsic demand) 
in the other two forms (institutions) i.e. election and contract.
18 Supra n 2. P. 366 19 Id. P. 367
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In Lon Fuller’s illustration:
We demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do not expect 
of the results of contract or of voting.... In entering contracts men. are of 
course in some measure guided by rational considerations. The subsistence 
farmer who has a surfeit of potatoes and only a handful onions acts reasonably 
when he trades potatoes for onions. But there is no test of rationality that can 
be applied to the result of the trade considered in abstraction from the interests 
of the parties.. .the trade of potatoes for onions. which is a rational act by one 
trader. might be considered irrational if indulged in by his opposite number. 
who has a store house full of onions and only a bushel of potatoes' 20
2.3 Arbitration and responsiveness
The other intrinsic element of the mode of participation of disputing parties 
by presentation of proof and arguments is responsiveness of the outcome of 
the proceeding to the presentations. The outcome is said to be responsive to 
the parties’ proof and arguments if it proceeds from. and is congruent with 
their presentations.21 This cannot however mean that perfect congruence must 
always be achieved. Yet marked digression of the final decision from the 
presentations made during the proceeding. will on the other hand. destroy the 
nature of adjudication. “[I]f the grounds for the decision fall completely out­
side the framework of the arguments [s] making all that was discussed or 
proved at the hearing irrelevant - then the adjudicative process has become a 
sham. for the parties participation in the decision has lost all meaning.”22
There are many threats to this ideal in practice. One and most important is 
the attempt by the arbitrator to take into consideration inputs falling outside 
presentation of the parties in the name of public policy. public interest etc. 
such would be not only an anomalous exercise. but also a dangerous one in 
the context of private law litigations. While. this doesn’t mean that the arbiter 
should not base his decision on the right legal principles for parties’ failure to 
invoke it. he should not lose the general framework of party presentation 
when doing so. in other words. since he controls the proceeding. the arbiter 
should direct the parties to make their most relevant presentations. Even 
when all the points on which the decision rests are touched on by the presen­
tations. if the emphasis of the decision is on the points dealt in passing by the 
parties in such a way as to make them regret that had they foreseen it. they 
would have presented different arguments and proofs. the adjudicative pro­
ceeding will be a deception.
The discussion made thus far is fairly dispositive of the true nature of arbi­
tration. Before we pass on to the abuses of the institution of arbitration. let us
20 Id. P. 367 | 21 Supra n 14. P. 413 22 Supra n 2. P. 388
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see the other variants of arbitration, if any. The only form that may occur to 
our mind is the rent - a judge model which is familiar in the USA. In this 
process, “the disputants in an attempt to avoid the use of a regular court se­
lect a retired judge to hear and decide a ... case as an arbitrator would.”23 
Unlike arbitration. however. his decision can be appealed for errors of law or 
on the ground that the judgment was against evidence, though such appeals 
are rare.”24 The other type that I feel compelled to caution not to be taken as a 
variant is the “umpire model.” This is not an independent form from the arbi­
tration model as such. The umpire is simply a person. not a process. It is an 
alternative to a presiding arbitrator in situations of plurality of arbitrators. An 
umpire is said to be “different from [the presiding] arbitrator in the sense that 
he or she is a person selected by the arbitrators to decide the matter in contro­
versy where the arbitrators are unable to agree. whereas a presiding arbitrator 
is just an additional arbitrator who may only act together with the other arbi­
trators.”25 Both the rent - a judge model and umpire process do not substan­
tially deviate from the pillar norms of the institution of adjudication. Thus. 
the participation by presentation of proofs and arguments and its entire de­
rivative attributes that spring there from apply to them.
3. Abuses of the Arbitration model
Certain practices of an institution represent practices that destroy or threaten 
to destroy the true model. In the case of arbitration. practices that threaten it 
are those that render meaningless the parties’ opportunities of participation in 
the proceeding by way of presenting proof and arguments. In this connection. 
three established practices can be identified.
3.1. The arbitrator acting as a settlement facilitator
The arbitrator acting as a settlement facilitator (or sometimes known as) the 
proactive arbitrator relates to an arbitration proceeding in which the arbitrator 
may initiate settlement at any stage during the proceeding.26 In such cases. if 
the settlement succeeds. the agreement reached by the parties will be turned 
into an award - consent award; or if the attempted settlement is not reached. 
the arbitral proceeding will resume from where it stopped. But. the 
“participation of the arbitral tribunal during an ongoing arbitration in settle­
ment negotiations would in reality be a mediation/conciliation process. re-
23 Steven Vago. Law and Socie/y.(Printice 
Hall.7th ed. 2003) 256
24 Ibid
25 Tilahun Teshome. “The Legal Regime
Governing Arbitration in Ethiopia: A
Synopsis.” (2007) 1 Ethiopian Bar Re­
view. 134
26 Hilmar Raeschte-Kessler. “The Arbitra­
tor as Settlement Facilitator.” 21Arbitra- 
tion International.^123
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quiring caucusing to be effective. During such caucusing the parties could by 
definition divulge secrets they would not have disclosed during the normal 
course of the arbitration to the arbitrator turned mediator and to other par­
ties.” 27
This seemingly innocuous practice may be attended by many dangers. 
First. it may open the way to a biased arbitrator to propose settlement when 
he finds out that the party he favors will be prejudiced if the arbitral proceed­
ing goes any further. one may challenge this view on the contention that 
since the arbitral tribunal’s proposal will have effect only when it is accepted 
by both parties such risk will not materialize. But. the impartial picture that 
the arbitrator displays can convince the victimized party to innocently agree 
to any such proposal. Yet. even when a party is suspicious of the tribunal’s 
proposal. it will seem risky for such party. to reject the proposal for fear that 
he will plant bias in the tribunal’s mind unless such party is dead sure about 
the tribunal’s bias and believes to face no greater risk in rejecting the pro­
posal.
Assume the settlement proposal is accepted. and ends in an agreement. 
How will such agreement be treated? In many cases it is endorsed by the tri­
bunal as a consent award - an ward on agreed terms- which is enforceable as 
an ordinary award. in other words an outcome which should have been ar­
rived at via the adjudicative process has been reached through the back door 
of proposal of settlement by the tribunal. The whole process of presentation 
of proof and arguments has been thrown away all along. This is a clear case 
of abuse or perversion of the institution of arbitration.
What will happen if the attempted settlement is not successful? Obviously. 
the arbitrator will resume the arbitral process. Here. there is even more dan­
ger to fear. The arbitrator might have already formed his own view of the 
matter in the settlement negotiation process. and may find it difficult to de­
part from.28 Crucial evidence which may determine the outcome might have 
been obtained both by the unscrupulous adversary and the bench. if this is so. 
then the participation by presenting proof and arguments will be impaired.
Let alone make a settlement proposal. an arbitral tribunal should not even 
initiate the proceeding. The institutional norms of adjudication do not allow 
arbitration to be initiated by the arbitrator. The very act of interfering in pri­
vate affair of the parties and initiating the arbitral proceeding not only ap­
pears to negate the impartial institutional stature. but it also in most cases car­
ries with it some degree of commitment and often a theory of “what hap­
pened”.29 In general. the main reasons as to why arbitration cannot be initi­
ated by the arbitrator can be reduced to two:
27 Id. P. 525 | 28 Id. P. 530 | 29 Supra n 2. p. 386
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First, it is generally impossible to keep even the bare initiation of proceed­
ings untainted by preconceptions about what happened and what its conse­
quences should be. In this sense, initiation of the proceedings by the arbiter 
impairs the integrity of adjudication by reducing the effectiveness of the 
litigant’s participation through proofs and arguments. Second, the great bulk 
of claims submitted to adjudication are founded directly or indirectly on 
relationships of reciprocity. in this case, unless the affected party is de­
ceived or ignorant of his rights, the very foundations of the claim asserted
30dictate that the process of adjudication must be invoked by the claimant.
3.2. Med-Arb/ Arb-Med
This is a procedure in “which the issues that were not solved by mediation 
are submitted to arbitration. with the same person /serving first as mediator. 
then as arbitrator.”30 31 This process is very similar to the case of arbitrator act­
ing as settlement facilitator. (discussed above). and the problems discussed 
therein apply here as well.
3.3. Award without offering reasons
If rationality is an integral element of the institution of adjudication. it neces­
sarily follows that the award be accompanied by reasons.32 The test of re­
sponsiveness to parties’ presentation is somewhat related to this issue. If rea­
sons are not given for the decision. how would the parties know that the arbi­
ter has taken their presentations as inputs. and has not decided on the basis of 
irrelevant consideration say on the throw of a dice? The outcome of an adju­
dicative process whether in state courts or in arbitration is often dispositive of 
the future conduct of the parties. If reasons are not given “the parties will al­
most inevitably guess at reasons and act accordingly.33 Thus. reasoned out­
comes are inseparably connected with the institutional norm of adjudication.
4. ADR as a variant of contract
Contract is one of the purest private law institutions along with and intrinsi­
cally fused into the institution of private property. Its basic and defining no­
tion is that of freedom of will or of consent. Very roughly. the ideal of free-
30 Id. P. 387; In Ethiopia Shimglina which
is the Amharic translation of Arbitration
can be initiated by the Shimagiles (the 
neutrals). Despite the approach in the 
Civil Code. “Shimglina is a practice that 
combines a hybrid of what a modern 
lawyer calls mediation. conciliation. 
compromise and arbitration proper”. See
Supra n 25.pp.117-118.
31 Supra n 25. P. 357
32 See for example. Teruo Doi. 
“International Commercial Arbitration in 
Japan”. in Peiter Sanders.(edr.) Interna­
tional Arbitration Liber Amicorum for 
Martin Domke. (The Hague. 1967).72- 
73
33 Supra n 2. p. 388
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dom of contract goes like this: ‘contracting parties are rational enough to best 
know their interest. and make the right choice of values in the course of bar­
gaining with each other. So. contractual obligations are freely and willfully 
assumed by both sides in return for reciprocal exchange of values.’ This cou­
pled with the notion of subjectivity of values. stands as the foundation of the 
doctrine of freedom of contract.
This is not to say that society doesn’t have any interest in private con­
tracts. Yet. any private “contract serves society only insofar as society is in­
terested in the individual enrichment made possible by a regime of reciproc­
ity.... If two men discover that by an agreement each can profit by giving up 
something he values less than the thing he receives in exchange for it. the 
individuals are enriched by virtue of their own evaluations of the objects of 
the exchange.”34 35 This is the reason why the outcome of a contractual bargain 
cannot be objectively defended. If the deal is fine for the contracting party. 
then it is the right deal. though it may be judged as unacceptable for on look-
When we look at contract as a dispute resolution institution. it is again this 
aspect (of freedom of will) what looms larger than the others and helps us 
sort it out from other rival institutions of adjudication and election. This free­
dom of consent exercised in the process of negotiation is what constitutes the 
essence of the dispute resolution dimension of the institution. So if contract is 
the essence of ADR. then it is this freedom of contract that defines the very 
nature of the mode of participation through the process of negotiation.
But what does the acronym ADR stand for. after all? Many people hold that 
it stands for “alternative dispute resolution”. in this regard. “icc has chosen 
to refer to ADR as ‘amicable dispute resolution’ rather than the more tradi­
tional ‘alternative dispute resolution.’36 Also. the set of processes that fall 
into the class of ADR can better be designated as “Amicable dispute resolu­
tion” mechanisms. The former usage was developed many years ago when 
the business community initially in the United States of America was search­
ing for dispute resolution mechanisms other than litigation in national 
courts”37 “Amicable dispute resolution’ not only corresponds well with the 
spirit of assisting parties toward a negotiated settlement. it also clarifies the 
confusion with arbitration and avoids the question ‘alternative to what?’38 In 
this respect. icc has in fact shown a determined stance by coming up with
34 Supra n 2. pp. 386 -387
35 Note that legal systems have tried hard to
avoid or limit the obnoxious results of
this view. one typical such attempt is
found in the doctrine of unconsionability 
- see Article 1710 of the Ethiopian
36
37
38
civil code
ADR International Application - Special 
Supplement 2003. ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin. 110 
Ibid 
Id.p.12
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unified rules for ADR in such a way as to allow parties to adapt it to the par­
ticular technique they choose-mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation-etc; 
and failing agreement on the particular technique to be adopted the fallback 
seems to be mediation.39
Generally the set of forms that fall within the category of ADR include 
Conciliation, Mediation, [Early] Neutral Evaluation, Expert Determination, 
Mini-trial, Negotiation, Compromise, etc. Often the list differs from country 
to country.
At this juncture two questions present themselves:
a) If ADR is a contract then what does mandatory ADR mean?
b) If ADR is a contract, why should there always be a neutral third party?
4.1. Mandatory Submission to ADR
The duty to submit to ADR proceedings will come into picture mainly in two 
situations: (1) when the occasion envisaged in the underlying contract materi­
alizes, and (2) when courts sponsor ADR programs for some category of 
cases and compulsorily refer parties to such programs. In certain exceptional 
situations the law can prescribe ADR.
4.2. The Participation of a Neutral
The participation of neutrals almost invariably characterizes all forms of 
ADR except negotiation. If ADR is a contract, pure and simple, then how can 
such practice be vindicated? Non interested third party participation is not 
alien to the institution of contract, after all. Agents and brokers are typical 
examples in contracts. But what practical significance does neutral participa­
tion have in ADR? Is it indispensable to the institution of ADR, that its prac­
tical importance will be impaired if not its conceptual coherence? Viewed in 
institutional terms, the presence of neutrals serves two major types of func­
tions. First, they may facilitate the negotiation process, by relieving the par­
ties of the embarrassment involved in admitting fault or “by representing a 
disputant who has distaste or a disability for discussing face to face person- 
ally”40 Caucusing in mediation and conciliation is exactly of such an aim. 
The difficulty makes the involvement of a neutral very important 
(indispensable). The second advantage of neutrals’ involvement is bringing 
some element of objectivity into negotiation in order to soften individual po- 
sitions.41
39 ADR Rules in Force as from 1, July 
2001; International Chamber of Com­
merce Dispute Resolution Services-ADR. 
www.iccadr.org
40 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “Private Order­
ing Through Negotiation: Dispute Settle­
ment and Rulemaking”(1976) 89 Har­
vard Law Review, 660
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The neutral is hence a person that doesn’t control any part of the proceed­
ing;41 42 neither the process nor the outcome. The parties control the whole 
process and the outcome. and the neutral assists them all along.
4.3 Some Misconceptions about ADR 
a) ADR and Due Process of Law
Due process of law is a legal tool which aims at protecting the rights of par­
ties in an adjudicative proceeding. It has two components: procedural and 
substantive. Due process is not unique to adjudication. as it can also be in­
volved in rule making proceedings more often at the administrative level than 
the legislative. The most important aspect of due process in the adjudicative 
context is procedural due process that demands that parties in dispute be 
given adequate notice and fair hearing. Fair hearing is multi pronged - it in­
cludes the right to be given equal opportunity with the opposing party in the 
over all proceeding. the right to present one’s own version of the case. the 
right to get all the documents and evidences produced by the opposing party 
against one self. the right to challenge those evidences and arguments. the 
right to produce one’s own witnesses. and challenge through cross - exami­
nation the opposing witnesses. the right to get good and equal attention from 
the bench for one’s presentations. etc. All these are compulsorily required in 
arbitration (unless waived by the parties). 43
in ADR. there is no hearing; generally no production of evidences and 
arguments. no presentation of witnesses. no cross examinations etc. This does 
not. on the other hand. mean that ADR proceedings do not involve any kind 
of discussions. presentations and explanations. ADR proceedings are of 
course required to be much more informative of the general personal emo­
tional and material backdrop of the dispute - A matter which cannot be at­
tained without open and candid discussions.
However. such discussions or presentations are not made in order to con­
vince the neutral as in arbitral hearings. What ADR gives the parties is the 
opportunity to really explore what the other side is looking for. and to iden­
tify the focus upon the issues. in other words. the neutral is never going to 
turn around and say “yes. ok you have persuaded me.” and there is little point 
in trying to convince him of a party’s arguments because ultimately the neu­
tral has no power to impose his own view upon the parties.44 Put differently.
41 Id. p. 662
42 But see. supra n 1. p. 482
43 Sometimes parties in arbitration waive the oral hearing component - not the documen­
tary presentation though.
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while the presentations in arbitration are made to the neutral, they are di­
rected to the parties in ADR.
b) ADR and the degree of neutrality of the “neutral”
It is an established tenet that the neutral in arbitration be completely neutral 
- impartial and independent. And. based on this any related person (whether 
in blood. business or marriage is deemed not neutral and hence) is unworthy. 
to arbitrate the dispute. Can the same be said of the neutral in ADR proceed­
ings? From all the foregoing analysis. the answer for this question will be 
“not exactly.” Although the third party in ADR proceedings is generally re­
quired to be neutral. there is no strict application of it. and if the parties want 
they can waive their right to it. X and Y may present their dispute to Y’s fa­
ther as a mediator or conciliator. In as far as the conciliator/mediator cannot 
give a binding decision the damage. if any; arising out of his partiality can be 
cancelled at the end. There may even be no need to wait till the end. A party 
who suspects the neutral of bias can quit the proceeding at the earliest possi­
ble sign of such conduct. Thus. neutrality of the third party in ADR. though it 
cannot be dismissed as unimportant. is not so important as in arbitration.
c) ADR, and Rationality and Responsiveness
It has already been indicated in the preceding section on arbitration that ra­
tionality is one of the intrinsic demands of the institution of Arbitration. This 
is because the means of participation of the parties in arbitration is by pre­
senting proof and arguments. and such participation. as a matter of necessity. 
calls for a rational analysis. This particular modality of participation by the 
parties in the process also gives rise to another quality to the arbitration pro­
ceeding- responsiveness of the outcome of the proceeding to party presenta­
tions.
Is same expected of the process and outcome of an ADR proceeding? Not 
necessarily. As for the requirement of rationality. although it would lift up the 
institution of ADR to its optimal level of utility. it is not mandatory for its 
proper operation. 44 45 ADR as a contract essentially involves exchanging val­
ues. and no objective and rational analysis can be made as to the propriety of 
a particular exchange made to resolve a dispute by the parties in as far as 
each party had gotten its choice.
Likewise. the requirement of responsiveness. though useful in ADR as 
well. is not guaranteed by the institution. The final settlement may be made
44 Toby Randle. Alternatives to Adjudication 11th Adjudication Update Seminar. http:// 
www.google.ca/search?hl=en&q=alternatives+to+a judication
45 Supra n 2
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without taking into consideration all the facts. figures and etc. made in the 
course of the discussions. and will still be valid. There is no mandatory re­
quirement that it should proceed from and be congruent with the presenta­
tions made by the parties. The course that leads to the final outcome may be 
dictated by an unexpected event that took place at the last minute in the nego­
tiation that falls outside the frame of party presentation.
5. Abuses in ADR
5.1. Mandatory ADR
ADR as a contract is therefore entirely dependent on the free will of the par­
ties. Any attempt of imposing ADR on the parties counters this freedom of 
contract. Mandatory ADR arises in two contexts: (a) court sponsored man­
datory ADR; and (b) Court enforced ADR clause in private contracts. Legally 
imposed ADR doesn’t exist in Ethiopia. and hence will not be discussed here.
a) Court annexed Mandatory ADR
Not all court sponsored (annexed) ADR is mandatory. But where it is com­
pulsory it vitiates the parties’ freedom of choice. Some of the reasons for 
courts to compel parties to attempt ADR may have to do with reducing court 
case load. help parties find a solution that will work better. or be timelier than 
determination of the court. or to offload some cases which are too complex 
for adjudication. etc. The first and third reasons have nothing to do with the 
interest of the parties. But the second reason seems to promote the interest of 
the parties to the dispute. It will still be paternalistic and counterproductive 
where it is an imposition.
There is also some empirical evidence that mandatory ADR is less attrac­
tive and effective than the voluntary one. in this regard. one scholar referring 
to the practice in the US has it that:
Although no statistical data exists about the number of participants refusing to 
engage meaningfully in mediation. it seems that the horse led to water by the 
courts that mandate mediation still refuses to drink. Instead of learning and using 
mandatory mediation to negotiate. many participants treat mandatory mediation 
like another part of litigation. Parties and lawyers as ordered by the court often 
show up at the mediation table but do not participate in a meaningful way. in 
many mediations. groups of participants show the same adversarial behavior as 
they do in the courtroom. 46
46 Archie Zariski. Mandatory ADR or an ADR Mandate? Encouraging Effective Dispute 
Resolution http://www.google.ca/search? 
hl=en&q=mandatory+adr&btnG=Google+Search&meta=.
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The results of compulsory ADR are not difficult to anticipate. No matter how 
benevolent its ends and its promotions, compelled ADR often thwarts the 
parties’ independence and fails to provide those sorts of procedures capable 
of alleviating concerns about fairness. It should come as no surprise. then that 
disputants resent and try to avoid compelled ADR. ADR’s legitimacy is 
eroded by its association with compulsion. It does not look or feel “safe” to 
those forced to use it. 47
b) Court enforced ADR clause in a private agreement
At times. courts may compel parties to live by their ADR agreement although 
one of the parties may decline to do so. The scenario occurs when a party 
goes to court notwithstanding an earlier agreement to resolve the dispute by 
ADR. However. compelling either party to respect ADR clause will not be 
fruitful since “[Often] after the first discussion with the neutral... either party 
is free to terminate the ADR proceeding.”48 The justification for such anoma­
lous procedure lies in the fact that the process presents the voluntary nature 
of ADR while allowing the parties to commit themselves to the agreed ADR
procedure.49
In effect. this means that if a party opts to refuse the ADR proceedings. it 
should appear before a neutral and say so. In other words. mandatory sub­
mission doesn’t compel an unwilling party to participate in ADR proceedings 
- it however requires him to express his refusal in a particular way - by ap­
pearing in front of a neutral. The attempt here is to guarantee the freedom of 
the parties at the same time maintaining meaningfulness of the ADR clause. 
In its proper institutional context. however. compelling parties to adhere to 
their agreed ADR procedure means forced performance of a contract which is 
always disallowed by the law if it vitiates the personal liberty of a party so 
compelled.50 Obviously. forcing a person to personally appear for ADR dis­
cussion and participate in it affects the personal liberty of the party so com­
pelled.
Be that as it may. mandatory submission is a typical instance of the 
“moss” that has developed around the institution of ADR- a practice that 
tends to blur the true nature of ADR by confusing it with other compulsory 
proceedings. whether or not such a practice is one that should be weeded out 
is a matter of calculating the pros and cons of doing so. Not every “moss” is 
harmful. however. and where the company of an institution by a moss is ad­
vantageous. there is no reason to abandon such company in as far as the es­
sence of the institution is not grossly inhibited.
47
48
49
Ibid
Supra n 46. p.12 
Ibid
50 Article 1776 of the Civil Code of Ethio­
pia (1960)
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5.2. ADR forms Yielding Final and Enforceable Outcomes
It has already been established so far that ADR is a contract and the process 
involved in it is negotiation. If the negotiation process is successful. then it 
will be wound up by a settlement agreement (often memorandum of settle­
ment in mediation and conciliation). If the ADR proceeding doesn’t end in 
settlement then there is no any agreement. as when a negotiation to conclude 
a contract of sale fails to succeed. there will be no agreement. if the ADR 
proceeding successfully ends in settlement what is the nature and effect of 
such settlement? Obviously such a settlement shall be binding as a contract. 
However. it is not final and readily enforceable in a court of law unlike an 
arbitration award which is directly executable. So if a party refuses to live 
unto the settlement that will be regarded as mere non performance of a con­
tractual obligation.
It thus follows that. the remedies against such party are either forced 
(specific) performance or cancellation of the contract with or with out com­
pensation depending on the existence of damage. So. ADR proceedings do 
not result in an outcome which the parties cannot refuse to live by. It is thus. 
perverting the institution of ADR to effect direct judicial execution of the 
outcome of an ADR proceeding. one of the typical practices in this line is the 
DAB (Dispute Adjudication Board) used in the construction sector. Under 
this rule. when a dispute ensues between a contractor and an employer it is 
referred to a dispute adjudication board or sometimes also called dispute ad­
judicator which has to decide the matter within 28 days. If any party is dissat­
isfied by the decision it has to notify his dissatisfaction to the other party and 
the neutral within 14 days as of the decision failing which the decision will 
be binding and non appealable at least provisionally.51 Such a model diverts 
the notion of adjudication to the extent that it ascribes the effect of adjudica­
tion to a contractual model of dispute resolution.
It is now obvious that a clear distinction emerges between ADR and Arbi­
tration from the foregoing analysis. This conceptual framework will also be 
significant as the issue of shimgilna is addressed below.
6. Variants of Shimglina
Shimglina, Giligil, Yezemed dangninet, and Irq: Terminology Differ­
ences or Conceptual?
These four Amharic terms are as confused in Ethiopia as ADR and arbitra­
tion. Our ultimate aim is placing each of these in their appropriate category -
51 See. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations Adjudication 
Rules of 2007 Art 5(4)
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ADR or arbitration. To this end, we shall first attempt to analyze their differ­
ence, if any, or explain their sameness.
In almost all the Amharic versions of legal texts in Ethiopia, the English 
term arbitration is translated as either Yezemed dangninet,52 or Shimglina,53 
or Giligil54 or less frequently, Irq.55 There are also provisions where any two 
of these terms are combined or interchangeably used at the same time.56 
Though use of two or more terms for one concept in the same provision gen­
erally suggests interchangeability, that doesn’t seem to be the case in Ethio­
pia. On top of the fact that there is no constantly used combination in the 
laws, each of these terms has its distinct meaning.
6.1 Shimglina
Shimglina., which literally means elderliness, denotes dispute solution by eld­
erly persons. It is the most rooted system in Ethiopian traditional dispute 
resolution scheme than the rest. Strikingly most Ethiopian nationalities have 
dispute resolution institutions which either literally i.e in names, composition 
and function correspond to Shimglina,57 or at least in composition and func­
tion resemble it.58 In all these cases either the name of the dispute resolution 
institution itself in the language of the community means dispute resolution
by the elderly, or in actuality it is run
52 See for example, the Civil Code Art. 941, 
945,1765, 3325-3326, 3328-3346; the 
Commercial Code Art 267(2)
53 See for example, the Civil Code Art; 973 
(3), 1275,(1) 1472,1473, 2271, 3327; the 
Commercial Code Art 647(3); Revised 
Family Code Art.118-122; Proclamation 
No.550/2007,Art 6(7) & 28(1,2); Proc­
lamation No.197/2000, Art 9(4); Procla­
mation No. 372/2003,Art 13(4)(c)
54 See for example the headings of Civil 
Code Arts 941,945 and 1275; the Com­
mercial Code Art 1038(1)(2)(3); Revised 
Family Code Art.288; Civil Procedure 
Code, Art.315 proclamation No 
341/2003, Arts 5(6),15(3),19(3); Procla­
mation 37/96 Art 22(2) ; Proclamation 
273/2002, Art 7(21); Proclamation 
377/2003 Art 143
55 while there is no pure use of this word 
its derivative “astaraki” is used for arbi­
tration under Article 118-122 of the Re-
by elderly persons. However, elderly
vised Family Code; and Art.945 of the 
Civil Code. Article 500(1) of the Com­
mercial Code also uses “magbabat” as 
the Amharic translation of the term arbi­
tration, while in the Amharic sense mag- 
babat is a procedure more akin to media­
tion or conciliation which can best be 
translated as Irq.
56 In the Civil Code, Art.941 uses the terms 
Giligil and Yezemed dangna, Art. 945 
uses Giligil and Yezemed Astaraki 
Dangna; Art 1275 uses the terms Giligil 
and yeShimglina dangninet. Art 118-122 
of the Revised Family Code also uses 
the terms Shimglina astaraki and astaraki 
shimagile. Atrs 316-319, - use the terms 
Giligil and Yebetezemed Dangninet, 
whereas Ats 350-357 of the same Code 
uses the terms Giligil and Yebetezemed 
Shimglina Dangninet, Regulation No 
115/2005, Art 36 uses both Shimglina 
dangninet and yeGiligil dangninet inter­
changeably.
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doesn’t merely signify age; it rather refers to the wisdom and social status of 
a person as valued by the community in question including. of course age and 
experience.
The other cross cutting similarity of most of these “shimglina” institutions 
is their versatility in terms of offering all qualities of what can otherwise in 
modern terms be offered by arbitration. conciliation. mediation. compromise. 
etc. This. in fact. is what typically characterizes Shimglina in Ethiopia as one 
renowned Ethiopian scholar in the field wrote.57 58 59 In almost all cases the elders 
can initiate the dispute resolution process.60 there is hearing and party presen-
57 For example. Jaarsummaa/Jaarsa Araaraa 
in Dejene Gemechu. Conflict and Con­
flict Resolution among Waliso Oromo of 
Eastern Macha: The Case of the Guma, 
Dept of Sociology and Social Anthropol­
ogy. Addis Ababa University. 2007. p. 
43; Jarsa Biyyaa of the Oromo See 
Areba Abdella and Berhanu Amenew. 
customary Dispute Resolution institu­
tion of the Oromia Region: The Case of 
Jarsa Biyya in Grass-roots Justice in 
Ethiopia: Contributions of Customary 
Dispute Resolution. Alula Pankhurst and 
Getachew Assefa (eds). p 172 ; Qabit- 
tino of Kafa. Shiyabe of the Berta. See 
Bayisa Besie and Lemessa Demie. Cus­
tomary Dispute Resolution in the Benis- 
hangul Gumuz with Emphasis on Shi- 
nasha Society. in Grass-Roots Justice in 
Ethiopia: Contributions of Customary 
Dispute Resolution. Alula Pankhurst and 
Getachew Assefa (eds). p.124; The insti­
tution of Songo of Sidama. See. Ayke 
Asfaw and Mekonnen Felleke. Custom­
ary Dispute Resolution in the SNNPR: 
The Case of the Sidama. in Grass-Roots 
Justice in Ethiopia: Contributions of 
Customary Dispute Resolution. Alula 
Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa (eds). 
pp.209-214
58 For Example the Institution of Maro of
the Afar. See Shimelis Habtewold and 
Getachew Talachew. Customary Dis­
pute Resolution in the Afar Society. in 
Grass-Roots Justice in Ethiopia: Contri­
butions of Customary Dispute Resolu-
tion. Alula Pankhurst and Getachew 
Assefa (eds).p.96; Afocha of the Hariri 
People. See Biruk Haile and Jira Mekon- 
nen. Customary Dispute Resolution in 
Harar. in Grass-Roots Justice in Ethio­
pia: Contributions of Customary Dispute 
Resolution. Alula Pankhurst and Ge- 
tachew Assefa (eds). p.157; Odayaal of 
the Somali People. See Mohamed Melin 
Seid and Zemedie Jotte. Customary Dis­
pute Resolution in the State of Somali: 
an Overview. in Grass-Roots Justice in 
Ethiopia: Contributions of Customary 
Dispute Resolution. Alula Pankhurst and 
Getachew Assefa (eds). p.190; Abbo 
Gereb of the Wajirat (Tigray). See 
Shimelis Gizaw and Tadesse Gessese. 
Customary Dispute Resolution in Tigray 
Region: Case Studies from three Dis­
tricts. in Grass-Roots Justice in Ethiopia: 
Contributions of Customary Dispute 
Resolution. Alula Pankhurst and Ge- 
tachew Assefa (eds). p.219
59 Supra n 25
60 Shimglina in Segat Kebele of North 
Shewa. See Melaku Abate and 
Wubeshet Shiferaw. Customary Dispute 
Resolution in Amhara Region: the case 
of Wofa Legesse in Northern shewa. in 
Grass-Roots Justice in Ethiopia: Contri­
butions of Customary Dispute Resolu­
tion. Alula Pankhurst and Getachew 
Assefa (eds).p.108; Areba Abdella and 
Berhanu Amenew Supra note 57. page 
172; Mohamed Melin Seid & Zemedie.
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tation of some sort,61 rendition of a morally binding decision,62 compro­
mise,63 no payment of fee for the services of the dispute resolution,64 etc.
Albeit the cross cutting uniformity in which it is applied in traditional 
Ethiopian communities, Shimglina in its broader sense remains to be a catch 
word used to refer to any out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism.65 The 
following two cases presented to the Federal First instance Court at Dire 
Dawa can further illustrate how confusing the use of the term is in practice.
Jotte, Supra n 58, p.190; Shimelis Gizaw 
and Tadesse Gessese, Supra n, 58, 
p.288; Sebsib Belay,Customary Dispute 
Reslolution in Addis Ababa,with Refer­
ence to Yeka Kifleketema, in Grass­
Roots Justice in Ethiopia: Contributions 
of Customary Dispute Resolution, Alula 
Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa 
(eds),p.238, Mentewab Zelelew and 
Mellese Madda, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Addis Ababa:the Case of 
Markato, in Grass-Roots Justice in 
Ethiopia: Contributions of Customary 
Dispute Resolution, Alula Pankhurst and 
Getachew Assefa (eds),p.250.
61 Shimelis Habtewold and Getachew Tala- 
chew, Supra n 58, p.98; Melaku Abate 
and wubeshet Shiferaw, Supra n 60, 
p.109; Biruk Haile and Jira Mekonnen, 
Supra n 58, p.158; Areba Abdella and 
Berhanu Amenew, Supra n 57, p.174; 
Mohamed Melin Seid and Zemedie 
Jotte, Supra n 58, p.191; Ayke Asfaw 
and Mekpnnen Felleke, Supra n 57, 
p.209; Sebsib Belay, Supra n 60, p.242; 
Mentewab Zelelew and Mellese Madda, 
Supra n 60, p.251.
62 Shimelis Habtewold and Getachew Tala- 
chew, Supra n 58, p.99; Melaku Abate 
and wubeshet Shiferaw, Supra n 60,
p.112; Biruk Haile and Jira Mekonnen, 
Supra n 58, p.160; Areba Abdella and
Berhanu Amenew, Supra n 57, p.175;
Mohamed Melin Seid and Zemedie 
Jotte, Supra n 58, p.191; Shimelis Gizaw
and Tadesse Gessese, Supra n 58, p.233; 
Sebsib Belay, Supra n 60, p.243; Mente­
wab Zelelew and Mellese Madda, Supra 
n 60, p.251
63 Shimelis Habtewold and Getachew Tala- 
chew, Supra n 58, p.100; Biruk Haile 
and Jira Mekonnen, Supra n 58, p.159; 
Mohamed Melin Seid and Zemedie 
Jotte, Supra n 52, p.190; Sebsib Belay, 
Supra n 54, p.242; Mentewab Zelelew 
and Mellese Madda, Supra n 54, p.251
64 Shimelis Habtewold and Getachew Tala- 
chew, Supra n 52, p.95; Melaku Abate 
and Wubeshet Shiferaw, Supra n 54, 
p.110; Biruk Haile and Jira Mekonnen, 
Supra n 52, p.158; Mohamed Melin Seid 
and Zemedie Jotte, Supra n 52, p.191; 
Shimelis Gizaw and Tadesse Gessese, 
Supra n 52, p.232; Mentewab Zelelew 
and Mellese Madda, Supra n 54, p.251; 
But Sebsib Belay, Supra n 54, p.243- 
there can sometimes be fee for the shi- 
magiles.
65 The process of securing the release of 
CUD leaders carried out by the Elders 
led by Professor Ephrem Yisak was des­
ignated as Shimglina. Though the nature 
of that process still remains beyond the 
knowledge of the public in general, and 
has been recently a disputed issue be­
tween the government and some of the 
released CUD leadrers, the dispute has 
never been on whether or not it is Shim- 
glina.
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a) Hajji Hassan Yusuf vs Hajji Amine Usso 66
The case was presented by Hajji Hassan Yusuf to the Federal First Instance 
Court at Dire Dawa in the form of application for the execution of a decision 
rendered by the Oromo Nation Cultural Institution which the parties had en­
trusted to resolve their dispute earlier. In brief the facts of the case are as fol­
lows:
Hajji Hassan Yusuf and Hajji Amine Usso were partners in a business. 
They wanted to dissolve their partnership but disagreed on sharing the pro­
ceeds. Three Shimglina processes were held to resolve the dispute in at least 
two of which the outcome was a decision in favor of Hajji Hassan Yusuf. 
During the first Shimglina. he was awarded Birr 181.200 and in the third 
Shimglina he was awarded 115.641 Birr. plus a share of 159 TV sets in the 
stock. [The result of the second Shimglina was not mentioned.]
Hajji Amine Usso defied the “decision” of the shimaglina and referred the 
matter to another Shimilina by the oromo Nation Cultural institution 
(ONCI). The ONCI after conducting oral hearing and without written pres­
entations (submissions) constituted new valuation experts with two more Shi- 
magiles as observers to make a report on the accounts of the business. In the 
meantime the ONCI made the parties to sign an undertaking to be bound by 
the outcome of the proceeding. And. eventually the ONCI Shimglina Coun­
cil with some degree of compromise decided that Hajji Amine Usso should 
pay his former partner 115.000 Birr and part of the proceeds from the sale of 
the TV sets in stock. Again Hajji Amine Usso refused to abide by the deci­
sion. Eventually Hajji Hassan Yusuf filed his application with the Dire Dawa 
First Instance Court for execution of the ONCI’s decision invoking Arts 
315.319(2) and 378 of the Civil Procedure Code as the basis of his applica­
tion.
The issue is whether or not this is arbitration proceeding and the decision 
is an award in which case direct execution can be sought?
b) Wro Abaynesh Tadesse vs Ato Wubshet et al (Seven respondents) 67
The parties had a dispute over inheritance since 1999. In April 2007 they 
resolved their dispute by a four member panel of shimagiles each side ap­
pointing two. The panel after examining the matter gave its “decision and 
opinion” - as it referred to what it gave. The “decision and opinion” con­
tained five counts four of which state that the panel’s decisions are based on
66 Hajji Hassan Yusuf vs Hajji Amine Usso 
(Federal First Instance Court at Dire
Dawa * Civil File No 24186)
67 Wro Abaynesh Tadesse vs Ato Wubshet 
et al (Federal First Instance Court at 
Dire Dawa * File No 02257)
126 Mizan Law Review Vol. 3 No.1. March 2009
the agreement of the parties (than on interpretation of legal provisions and 
determination of the rights based thereon.) The panel in fact did not invoke 
any legal provision for its “opinion and decision.” What is more, the panel, 
interestingly enough, made all parties to sign at the end of the document 
which embodied its “decision and opinion.”
The decision of the Shimglina was presented by Wro Abaynesh to the 
Federal First Instance Court at Dire Dawa for execution on the contention 
that it is an arbitral award per Art 378 of the Civil Procedure Code. The issue 
that would arise is whether this is arbitration, and whether the decision ex­
ecutable as an arbitral award?
The first case is more controversial than the second. it triggers at least two 
important questions: (1) what type of institution can be entrusted with the 
task of resolving disputes by arbitration; and (2) what procedure should be 
followed for a given dispute resolution proceeding to be taken as arbitration 
and its outcome as an enforceable award?
As far as the first question is concerned, there is no clear answer. But the 
general State policy seems to give this power only to selected institutions; it 
is only the chambers of commerce and the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange 
that the State has so far recognized by law to resolve disputes of their mem­
bers by arbitration as per their rules 68 - institutional arbitration.69 The Ethio­
pian state policy seems to be further clarified by the prohibition of the Ethio­
pian Arbitration and Conciliation Center (EACC) from offering the service of 
arbitration while the same institution is not barred from giving mediation ser- 
vices.70 What makes the case of ONCI further complicated is the fact that it is 
a cultural institution that falls within the scope of Constitutional protection 
under Art.78(5) which states:
Pursuant to sub-Article 5 of Article 34 the House of Peoples' Representa­
tives and State Councils can establish or give official recognition to reli­
gious and customary courts. Religious and customary courts that had state 
recognition and functioned prior to the adoption of the Constitution shall be 
organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by this Constitution.
But can article 78(5) of the Constitution be of any help in the above context? 
Note that, the above provision refers to article 34(5) of the Constitution
68 See proclamation 341/2003 Art 5(6), 15 
(3X19(3); and Proclamation 550/2007 
Art 6(7).
69 See infra note 71.
70 My attempt to secure an official docu­
ment evidencing the prohibition was not 
successful. But on phone conversation
with Wro Haregewoin Ashenafi, Manag­
ing Director of EACC, it has been con­
firmed. Wro Haregewoin also added that 
the prohibition has been lifted unoffi­
cially on condition that arbitration is 
carried out by volunteer arbitrators and 
EACC exacts no fees.
3 (1) Mizan Law Rev. Underlying Distinctions: ADR. Shimglina. Arbitration 127
which authorizes cultural and religious dispute resolution institutions in rela­
tion to personal and family law matters only. Thus. it may literally be argued 
from the state policy perspective that. even if the ONCI had followed the 
right procedures in arbitrating the above mentioned case. its award may not 
be valid. But the law (both the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure) 
nowhere prohibits arbitration by an institution. if parties can entrust resolu­
tion of their dispute to their chosen arbitrators Mr. X. Y and Z. there is no 
any reason why they should be prohibited from referring their dispute to an 
institution for the latter to resolve it for them. What is the difference between 
the following two scenarios?
Parties refer to a given law firm. or association of arbitrators to appoint three 
arbitrators from its members and resolve their dispute
Parties appoint three members from the law firm. or the association of ar­
bitrators in question to arbitrate their dispute
Strictly speaking. there is no difference. This is not to suggest that the 
much treasured service of arbitration be reduced to an over-the-counter mer­
chandize. But we cannot conjure up unnecessary prohibitions where the law 
lays none. Thus. there is no reason why such arbitration as in the above ex­
ample will not be valid as ad-hoc arbitration.71 Thus. the law does not pro­
hibit ad-hoc arbitration by institutions if parties willfully submit to it. This 
should however. be taken with the caveat that only legally empowered insti­
tutions can make their own rules and administer arbitration (institutional arbi­
tration).
in as far as the second question is concerned. it is pretty clear that the pro­
cedure required for arbitral proceeding is not observed. So the decision of the 
ONCI will be invalid as an award from that respect at least.
When we come to the second case. the only issue is how and in what form 
the award should be given. Can arbitrators issue their decisions without ana­
lyzing submissions of the parties solely based on their agreement? No. be-
71 The ad-hoc vs institutional arbitration 
dichotomy is seldom clarified in litera­
tures. But. arbitration will qualify as 
institutional arbitration if the following 
two conditions exist: 1. it proceeds under 
the auspices of an arbitration institution; 
2 pursuant to the rules of such institu­
tion. The only exception to this is the 
widespread acceptance by many arbitral 
institutions to auspice arbitration per 
UNCITRAL Rules- See UNCTAD Inter­
national Commercial Arbitration Mod­
ule, Geneva. 2005. pp.31-32; See also 
Article 5 of the Revised Arbitration 
Rules of The Addis Ababa Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectoral Associa- 
tions’(AACCSA) 25. December 2008 
which defines ad-hoc arbitration as an 
arbitration in which the institute offers 
secretarial services in situations where 
the Institute’s Rules are not used.
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cause, arbitration must involve the rendition of reasoned decision which re­
sponds to the parties’ arguments and proofs. In fact, the decision of the arbi­
trators in this case bears the signatures of all the parties involved implying it 
is an agreement. and not just a decision independently reached by the tribu­
nal. And. this shows that the proceeding is not arbitration - it is conciliation 
in its true sense. Thus. it cannot be submitted for courts for direct execution 
as an award.
There are certain similarities between the institution of shimglina and ex 
aeqo et bono arbitration-sometimes known as extra legal arbitration.72 But 
shimglina is broader than ex aequo et bono arbitration. Ex aeqo et bono arbi­
tration relates to the circumstances where a tribunal decides a dispute based 
on standards (such as equity. fairness. and conscience) other than on any 
given positive law. and does not have anything to do with the procedural law 
applicable on arbitration.73 It refers to the substantive law applicable on the 
merits of the dispute. Shimglina on the other hand is completely independent 
both in terms of the substantive as well as the procedural rules it applies. 
Moreover. while the outcome of an ex aeqo et bono arbitration is an arbitra­
tion award pure and simple. the outcome of shimglina is not.74
6.2 Giligil
Giligil on the other hand is much less commonly used in the codes though it 
is not devoid of confusion in its turn. The confusion in relation to this term is 
basically the Civil Code’s use of it as the Amharic equivalent of the concept 
of compromise in Articles 3307-3325. Obviously this is not just a slip of the 
pen. The term Giligil appears in the chapter several times. Moreover. the 
popular and intuitive understanding of the term. indeed. conforms to a kind of 
amicable process of dispute resolution.75 What is further confusing is that the 
Code uses this term in the chapter dealing with arbitration. i.e.. Chapter two 
of Title XX only once under Article 3325(5) and in the rest of the chapter the 
term used is Yezemed dangninet. Shimglina is used only under Article 3327. 
But most of the proclamations issued after the codes use the term Giligil. The 
Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association’s Arbitration 
Rules also uses the term Giligil.76
72 One of the assessors of this article holds 
that the two are the same.
73 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 33
(1) and (2); Also see generally. Leon
Trakman. Ex Aeqo Et Bono: De­
Mystifying an Ancient Concept. Univer­
sity of New South Wales. Faculty of
Law. Research Paper Number 2007-39
74 Supra n 62
75 Supra n 60. p. 109.
76 The Revised Arbitration Rules of the 
Addis Ababa Chamber Commerce and 
Sectoral Associations. 25 November 
2008.
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6.3 Yezemed danginet/ Yebetezemed danginet
The “yezened danginet” and “yebetezemed danginet” are much related terms. 
Though much more widely used in the Codes. these terms do not appear in 
proclamations reviewed by this writer. Nor could this writer find these terms 
in the several arbitration cases he reviewed.77 This being the only discernible 
pattern in this respect. the terms seem to have originated in the traditional 
family law institutional setting. This seems to be apparent from the word 
“yezemed” which means “of a (by blood or consanguinity) relative.” Entrust­
ing the task of resolving disputes to the relative of both parties might have 
been practicable in the traditional agrarian close knit society. But using it to 
translate arbitration in modern Ethiopia will surely be a digression from the 
basic tenets of the institution. such as impartiality and independence of the 
arbitrator. in this respect why these terms are abandoned in the recent procla­
mations and in arbitral cases seems to be clear.
6.4. Irq
The term Irq is the Amharic translation of the term “conciliation” in the 
English version of the Civil Code. Title XX of the Code which contains pro­
visions on Compromise and Arbitral submissions is fairly well organized. It 
is. following the formulation of the heading. divided into two chapters: Chap­
ter One on Compromise and Chapter Two on Arbitral Submission. Section 1 
thus sets out with a definition that goes: “a compromise is a contract....” In­
terestingly. Section 2 on conciliation doesn’t give a definition for the term. 
The reason for this is clear; conciliation is a compromise. and thus a contract 
as per the general definition of compromise in Article 3307. This in a way 
conforms to the claim made earlier that the essence of ADR is contract.
Explaining the confusion in relation with the institution of Arbitration in 
Ethiopia only from the perspective of terminology may be oversimplifica­
tion. There has much to do as well with the concept itself as incorporated in 
the codes. One typical provision having such confusion is Articles 2271of the 
Civil Code. The provision reads:
Article 2271 price estimated by third party
1. The price may be referred to the arbitration of a third party.
2. There shall be no sale where such third party refuses or is unable to make
an estimate
What the above provision calls for is an estimator when the parties (seller and 
buyer) fail to agree on the price. But the problem is whether we would con­
77 More than 30 arbitration cases have been reviewed for the purpose of writing this 
article.
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sider the process of involving third party expert evaluation as arbitration. 
Certain questions arise at this juncture. Does it involve party presentation or 
at least the right thereto in the form of proof and arguments? Can the estima­
tion of the third party be regarded as an award and thus binding?78
Moreover, the provision contemplates the likelihood of such “arbitrator” 
being unable to estimate the price. An arbitrator has no room (as there is none 
for the judge in a state court) to be unable to give decision once he rightly 
assumes jurisdiction unless the plaintiff withdraws his case or the parties set­
tle their dispute outside the tribunal. No doubt this provision should have re­
ferred to conciliation instead, if not to the most appropriate current schemes 
such as expert determination, neutral evaluation, etc. Is article 2271 just a slip 
of the pen? On the face of it, it seems to be so if one reads the equivalent of 
Article 2271 in the Code Civil of France79 which reads as Article 1591 and 
1592.
Art-1591: the price of sale must be determined and stated by the parties.
Art-1592: it may however [sic] left to the estimation of a third person; where the 
person is unwilling or unable to make an estimate there is no sale.
Despite the closeness in wording between these two provisions, Article 2271 
is not modeled after the above provision. The above quoted provisions from 
the French Civil Code Articles 1591 and 1592 are of course, the revised ver­
sions of Act no 2000-1208 of 13 Dec. 2000. It follows that Article 2271 is 
modeled after the Code Napoleon of 1804 since the latter was one of the ma­
jor sources of the Ethiopian Civil Code. Indeed, Art. 1592 of the Code Napo­
leon uses the word arbitration just like Art.2271.
Art. 1591: The price of sale must be determined and designated by the parties
Art.1592: It may nevertheless be left to the arbitration of a third person; if 
such third person is not or cannot make an estimate there is no 
sale.
This begs the question as to what the old usage of the term arbitration was in 
France and possibly in the Civil Law traditions in general. There were many 
distinct procedures which bore the name of arbitration in medieval Europe. 
France for instance had three distinct procedures in the name of arbitration 
which were arbitration and amiable composition dealt by the Code of Civil 
Procedure, and arbitration dealt within the Civil Code.80 Likewise, in medie­
78 See the comparable provision in Articles 1472, 73 where arbitrators may be called in 
only to make valuation which is binding on the parties as an award.
79 http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&q=Code+Civile+of+France&start=10&sa=N
80 Rene David, Arbitration in international Law, Kluwer law and Taxation Publishers, 
1985, p.84
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val Italy as well three types of arbitration processes existed: arbitration 
proper. amiable composition. and arbitraggio.81 Arbitraggio was a process 
which aimed at the completion of a contract (gap filling) - a function which 
is outside of the jurisdiction of the courts.”82 The amiable compositeur in 
both cases (of France and Italy) “was not bound to decide in accordance with 
the law. since he was regarded fundamentally. as a conciliator;.. .he wasn’t 
also a conciliator pure and simple since he was regarded as empowered to 
impose his decisions.”83
As time went by. however. the concept was further refined leaving behind 
more conciliation like procedures and sticking to the adjudicative essence. 
such a development must have also been reinforced by influx of common 
law conceptions. Furthermore. the special need to achieve harmonization of 
arbitration laws to suit the growing need of uniformity in international com­
merce must have added the impetus for the emergence of the modern quintes­
sence of arbitration.
6.5- Which Amharic term may be taken as equivalent to 
Arbitration?
The foregoing discussion might have in a way alluded that arbitration is an 
imported institution. if so. the writer’s effort has met one of its objectives. 
But now is the time to be candid about it. indeed. the main cause of the con­
fusion is the attempt to translate the imported institution of arbitration by 
means of an existing (domestic) institution. Arbitration is a western institu­
tion 84 transplanted into Ethiopia along with many other institutions. This is 
not to undermine its importance; not every transplanted institution should be 
condemned. or for the mere fact that it is a transplant it should not be taken to 
be a threat to indigenous institutions. as far as it has important purposes to 
serve. There is no doubt that the major importance of arbitration lies in the
81 Id. p.93
82 Ibid. Rene David adds that the sense in 
which the word arbitraggio is used in 
Italy is different. It is said that Italians 
do not use the word arbitraggio in the 
context of a dispute; and their 
‘arbitrators’ are called third persons or 
good men.they are asked to give a de­
cision or an answer to the question sub­
mitted to them. not to render an award. 
Id.p.95. it appears that articles 1765 is 
inspired by this tradition.
83 Id. p.87
84 See Michel T. Moser “Arbitration in 
Asia: An overview in International Com­
mercial Arbitration in Asia”) Special 
Supplement to (1998) ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin ( Nov)6- 
10; Fails Narimy. East Meets West: 
Tradition. Globalization and the Future 
of Arbitration. Arbitration International, 
Vol. 20. No2.2004. pp.124-125; But see 
Bezawork Shimelash. The Formation. 
Content and Effect of an Arbitral Sub­
mission Under Ethiopian Law. (1994) 
17JEL 69
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fact that it is internationally the most recognized reliable mechanism of dis­
pute resolution for foreign investors. Without robust system of arbitration, 
attracting foreign investment is indeed very difficult. The importance of arbi­
tration for the growth of the private sector in the domestic arena cannot be 
downplayed as well.
Thus the transplantation of the institution into the Ethiopian legal system is 
not objectionable. But what term should have been used to translate it into 
Amharic? The best option would be to spell the word arbitration in Amharic 
characters and abandon the futile attempt of translating it via existing institu­
tions. It seems too late, however to introduce such a solution at this juncture. 
it may create more confusion. it would thus be easier and more plausible to 
consistently use either “Shimglina” or “Giligil dangninet". This writer how­
ever suggests “Giligil dangninef ’ for Shimglina as indicated above represents 
a distinct. independent and salient institution that is perhaps unique to Ethio­
pia.
in this way we will not only resolve the confusion revolving around the 
institution of Arbitration and ADR in Ethiopia. we will also have one more 
alternative in the Ethiopian kit of ADR in the form of Shimglina. Thus the 
new law ought to give explicit recognition to conciliation-Shimglina and ar­
bitration. Does this sound odd? May be yes. as it does not match up with the 
international practice. But should we always establish congruence between 
our institutions and the international (or rather western) institutions? In fact. 
many legal systems have their salient domestic dispute resolution institutions; 
Italy has arbitraggio. USA has the ‘rent a judge’ scheme. If Ethiopia has 
Shimglina as a separate and distinct institution from arbitration. it would not 
be that strange.
Conclusions
The distinction between ADR and Arbitration has much more to do with their 
underlying institutional foundations than mere degree of intrusiveness of the 
neutral during the dispute resolution process. The belief that ADR and Arbi­
tration can be placed along a continuum in one spectrum is thus an oversim­
plification of the matter. Thus. as far as their underlying institutional bases 
are concerned. ADR is a contract while Arbitration falls under Adjudication. 
It is only when each form is rightly placed in its proper institutional context 
that it can both be properly understood and be effectively used. Or else. any 
attempt of looking at each scheme outside its core institutional basis is bound 
to erode its essence and utility.
Thus. one position that results from this distinction is the mutual exclu­
siveness of ADR and Arbitration. Although one cannot deny commonalities 
between the two institutions as dispute resolution institutions. such common­
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alities are too little compared to their difference to justify pigeonholing them 
together.
In the Ethiopian context. what vaguely lies between ADR and Arbitration 
is Shimglina. Strictly speaking. this is a mixture of both Arbitration and ADR 
at least in terms of the process aspect. Being unique to Ethiopia. however. 
Shimglina is both pervasive throughout the country and also sometimes used 
as a catch word to refer to all forms of out-of-court dispute resolution mecha­
nisms. Thus. the concept of Shimglina is so nebulous and imprecise to trans­
late the concept of arbitration into Amharic. in this connection. Ethiopian law 
doesn’t have consistent term in Amharic for the concept of arbitration. but 
freely uses giligil, yezemed dangninet, irq and shimglina.
Although none of these words hit the nail on its head with due precision. 
'giligil dangninef seems to be preferable for it has gained better acceptance 
among the lawyer community. and owing to its wider use in recent legisla­
tions. Such interpretive short-term solutions will indeed serve a limited pur­
pose. until the problems highlighted above are resolved through the enact­
ment of comprehensive law on arbitration and ADR that sufficiently reflects 
the distinction between the two institutions. Meanwhile. this legislative solu­
tion is expected to accord express recognition to shimglina as a variant of 
ADR and as a deep-rooted legacy distinct from arbitration. -------------------------■
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